Home - Evaluating resources - Library Guides at UC Berkeley. To find out more about an author: Google the author's name or dig deeper in the library's biographical source databases. To find scholarly sources: When searching library article databases, look for a checkbox to narrow your results to Scholarly, Peer Reviewed or Peer Refereed publications. To evaluate a source's critical reception: Check in the library's book and film review databases to get a sense of how a source was received in the popular and scholarly press. To evaluate internet sources: The internet is a great place to find both scholarly and popular sources, but it's especially important to ask questions about authorship and publication when you're evaluating online resources. If it's unclear who exactly created or published certain works online, look for About pages on the site for more information, or search for exact quotations from the text in Google (using quotation marks) to see if you can find other places where the work has been published. Philosophy of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. A phrenological mapping. Dualism can be traced back to the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy. This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 1. Baruch Spinoza. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism). Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual- aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 2. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move his or her body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain what he or she wants. To find out more about an author: Google the author's name or dig deeper in the library's biographical source databases. To find scholarly sources. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of Ren. It begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non- physical. BCE), which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakriti (material substance). 1 PBI-004 Created July/ 2010. Introduction The North American pawpaw is in the early stages of commercial production. How many Americans personally own guns, and what do they use them for? A recent Gallup Poll* shows that 3 in 10 Americans personally own a gun; most gun owners say. Travelling like tramps around the World for less than $25 a day. Aenean sollicitudin, lorem quis bibendum auctor, nisi elit consequat ipsum, necittis sem nibh id elit. Duis sed odio sit amet nibh vulputate. He was therefore the first to formulate the mind. If asked what the mind is, the average person would usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity. They would almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain, or vice versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic, or simply unintelligible. So, for example, one can reasonably ask what a burnt finger feels like, or what a blue sky looks like, or what nice music sounds like to a person. But it is meaningless, or at least odd, to ask what a surge in the uptake of glutamate in the dorsolateral portion of the hippocampus feels like. Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events . There are qualia involved in these mental events that seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical. David Chalmers explains this argument by stating that we could conceivably know all the objective information about something, such as the brain states and wavelengths of light involved with seeing the color red, but still not know something fundamental about the situation . Dualism must therefore explain how consciousness affects physical reality. One possible explanation is that of a miracle, proposed by Arnold Geulincx and Nicolas Malebranche, where all mind. Knowledge, however, is apprehended by reasoning from ground to consequent. Therefore, if monism is correct, there would be no way of knowing this. The basic idea is that one can imagine one's body, and therefore conceive the existence of one's body, without any conscious states being associated with this body. Chalmers' argument is that it seems possible that such a being could exist because all that is needed is that all and only the things that the physical sciences describe about a zombie must be true of it. Since none of the concepts involved in these sciences make reference to consciousness or other mental phenomena, and any physical entity can be by definition described scientifically via physics, the move from conceivability to possibility is not such a large one. It has been argued under physicalism that one must either believe that anyone including oneself might be a zombie, or that no one can be a zombie. This argument has been expressed by Dennett who argues that . He also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties. Many contemporary philosophers doubt this. Freud claimed that a psychologically- trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than the person himself does. Duhem has shown that a philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than that person herself does, while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are. He also asserts that modern psychological experiments that cause people to see things that are not there provide grounds for rejecting Descartes' argument, because scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than the person herself can. We know people make mistakes about the world (including another's internal states), but not always. Therefore, it is logically absurd to assume persons are always in error about their own mental states and judgements about the nature of the mind itself. Other forms of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown. Psychophysical parallelism. Instead, they run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other. Although Leibniz was an ontological monist who believed that only one type of substance, the monad, exists in the universe, and that everything is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between . He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre- established harmony. While body and mind are different substances, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion. In other words, it is the view that non- physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical bodies (at least, brains). How mental and physical properties relate causally depends on the variety of property dualism in question, and is not always a clear issue. Sub- varieties of property dualism include: Strong emergentism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i. Hence, it is a form of emergent materialism. They are dependent on the physical properties from which they emerge, but opinions vary as to the coherence of top. A form of property dualism has been espoused by David Chalmers and the concept has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by- products (i. The ontological stance towards qualia in the case of non- reductive physicalism does not imply that qualia are causally inert; this is what distinguishes it from epiphenomenalism. Panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say mechanical behaviour is derived from primitive mentality of atoms and molecules. So long as the reduction of non- mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not a (strong) form of property dualism; otherwise it is. Dual aspect theory. In modern philosophical writings, the theory's relationship to neutral monism has become somewhat ill- defined, but one proffered distinction says that whereas neutral monism allows the context of a given group of neutral elements and the relationships into which they enter to determine whether the group can be thought of as mental, physical, both, or neither, dual- aspect theory suggests that the mental and the physical are manifestations (or aspects) of some underlying substance, entity or process that is itself neither mental nor physical as normally understood. Various formulations of dual- aspect monism also require the mental and the physical to be complementary, mutually irreducible and perhaps inseparable (though distinct). As example of these disparate degrees of freedom is given by Allan Wallace who notes that it is, . This philosophy also is a proponent of causal dualism which is defined as the dual ability for mental states and physical states to affect one another. Mental states can cause changes in physical states and vice versa. However, unlike cartesian dualism or some other systems, experiential dualism does not posit two fundamental substances in reality: mind and matter. Rather, experiential dualism is to be understood as a conceptual framework that gives credence to the qualitative difference between the experience of mental and physical states. Experiential dualism is accepted as the conceptual framework of Madhyamaka Buddhism. Madhayamaka Buddhism goes even further, finding fault with the monist view of physicalist philosophies of mind as well in that these generally posit matter and energy as the fundamental substance of reality. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the cartesian dualist view is correct, rather Madhyamaka regards as error any affirming view of a fundamental substance to reality. In denying the independent self- existence of all the phenomena that make up the world of our experience, the Madhyamaka view departs from both the substance dualism of Descartes and the substance monism.
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